I. Introduction
Since at least the mid 1970s, a high priority of the World Bank and many other donors has been to induce LDC governments to transform their economies from highly regulated and centrally controlled to deregulated and market-based. But even without donor intervention, poor growth performance and balance of payments problems on their own might necessitate this transition. Has World Bank lending promoted deregulation with stronger incentives and critical resources (finance and advice) or slowed the process by blunting the impact of crises and Section II reviews previous research, focusing on empirical studies of aid, regulation and related topics. Section III presents the data and model to be estimated. Section IV discusses results and Section V concludes. More recently, researchers both inside and outside aid institutions have emphasized political aspects of the reform process as well. From a political economy perspective, putting resources in the hands of committed reformers allows them to distribute benefits and thus "buy support" for reforms. Benefits may include delaying enforcement of tax laws, providing transitional funding to former government employees, compensating commercial interests hurt by trade liberalization, and prolonging popular price controls on such items as food and fuel 2 Svensson (2000B) actually uses this argument to explain why an altruistic donor government might delegate to a less altruistic international agency, e.g., the World Bank. Hagen (2004) points out that Svensson's analysis is a partial explanation, more applicable to some donors (e.g., the Scandinavians) than to others (e.g., the U.S. and France) and introduces a second dimension of recipient heterogeneity: aid productivity. In either model, time inconsistency due to altruism may lead to unenforced conditionality. Collier (1997) takes the argument a step further, suggesting that recipient governments will undermine growth intentionally if donors follow need-based allocation.
II. Previous Research
3 (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Blanchard, 1996; Fleck, 2000; Rodrik, 1996) . Access to World Bank loans is critical to provide such resources since, in the midst of such crises, the recipient government cannot access commercial credit.
However, much recent research finds structural adjustment lending an ineffective tool for a number of reasons. The World Bank is often reluctant to enforce conditions attached to its loans and credits (Mosley et al., 1995) at least in part because of institutional incentives to continue lending regardless of outcomes, the so-called "pressure to lend." A more charitable explanation is found in the classic Samaritan's Dilemma. For a sufficiently altruistic donor, giving aid is a dominant strategy. Thus, donor conditions are not credible and do not impact recipient governments' reform decisions (Svensson, 2000B) . 2 A less sympathetic critique emphasizes donor interests rather than altruism. Defensive lending and promotion of donor economic and strategic interests may create an imperative to dispense aid even in a multilateral agency (Fleck and Kilby, 2001; Mosley et al., 1995; Svensson, 2003; Tendler, 1975; Villanger, 2004) .
Donor involvement may even work against reform (Boockmann and Dreher, 2003 conditions, it will delay policy change.
These issues are critical for the debate over aid effectiveness in promoting growth and reducing poverty. A number of studies find that aid is only effective in good policy environments Dollar, 2000, 2004; World Bank, 1998) . This poses a number of questions. If aid cannot induce policy change-as Burnside and Dollar (2000, henceforth BD) suggest-then aid directed at poor policy environments is doubly ineffective: it fails to promote growth directly because the policy environment is poor and it fails to promote growth indirectly by changing the policy environment to a pro-growth one. Thus, if growth is a necessary condition for aid to achieve its goals, aid should be allocated selectively to countries which already have good policy environments (Collier, 1997; Collier and Dollar, 2001) . Conversely, if aid can induce policy change, then even aid to countries with poor policies will promote growth albeit indirectly. In this case, the appropriate allocation of aid depends on relative impact and need (balancing between aid to poor policy environments to promote change, aid to good policy environments to directly promote growth, and aid to those most in need since there is some impact-direct or indirect-in all settings).
While the World Bank, the U.S. administration and many other donors have recently embraced the selective approach to aid allocation, there has been a strong response from the academic community. Critiques have used a variety of approaches; the most compelling are empirical studies that demonstrate BD's results are not robust to changes in sample or specification (Clemens et al., 2004; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Easterly, 2003; Easterly et al., 2004; Tarp, 2000, 2001; Roodman, 2004) . At a minimum, the empirical foundation of the selective approach to aid allocation seems too fragile to justify this major shift in donor policy (Easterly et al., 2004) .
In light of this debate, attention has recently turned to whether aid facilitates specific types of reform. According to Banerjee and Rondinelli (2003, 1528) , "although the literature on the effects of foreign aid on economic growth and development is large and growing, analysis of its impacts on economic reforms in general, and on specific reform policies such as privatization, is still nascent." Below, I review five areas of research on aid and policy that are important for this study: aid and government size (Remmer, 2004) ; aid and privatization (Banerjee and Rondinelli, 2003) ; aid and corruption (Alesina and Weder, 2002; Tavares, 2003; and Svensson, 2000A) ; aid and foreign investment (Harms and Lutz, 2003) ; and aid and regulation (Kilby, 2005) . All are empirical studies that provide guidance for the current work.
Remmer (2004) studies how government size (the ratio of government expenditures to GDP) relates to aid flows. Shrinking third world governments is a common donor objective especially since the debt crisis and the advent of the "Washington Consensus" (Williamson, 1990 (Williamson, , 2003 . Yet aid could easily have the opposite effect:
...the notion that augmenting the resources of a government from outside may reduce or have no systematic effect on government size is intrinsically implausible. The reason is that the political costs and benefits of expenditures financed by external resources and those funded by domestic taxation or revenue generation differ significantly. (Remmer, 2004, 80) This is particularly true if aid conditions are only weakly enforced. Remmer also suggests that countries dependent on aid may expect to leverage fiscal deficits into more future aid. Using 3 Remmer also controls for openness, demographics, GDP per capita, debt service ratio, and government revenue as a share of GDP. (Banerjee and Rondinelli, 2003, 1546) . The estimates suggest that aid does not have a systematic effect on the start of privatization. 5 See for example Acemoglu et al. (2001 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2002 , Diamond (1997) , Easterly and Levine (2003) , Fleck and Hanssen (2003) , Rodrik et al. (2002) , Sachs (2003) . 6 The ethnolinguistic fractionalization variable is for 1960 and "measures the probability that two randomly selected people in a country belong to different ethnolinguistic groups" (449).
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Several empirical studies look at the impact of aid on corruption using aggregate crosscountry data. Alesina and Weder (2002) provide evidence of Lane and Tornell's (1996) "voracity effect" (aid causing increased corruption) but note that they do not substantially address potential endogeneity (corruption attracting aid). Tavares (2003) Finally, Kilby (2005) examines links between overall aid and regulation, estimating separate aid allocation and regulation equations. As in Svensson (2000A) , the measure of regulation is the Fraser Institute's "Freedom from Government Regulation" index. The measure of aid is effective development assistance disbursements from all donors as a percent of real GDP per capita (both in constant 1996 dollars), the same measure used in BD, Easterly et al (2004), and Roodman (2004) . Instrumenting for regulation with ethnolinguistic fractionalization, membership in the Central African Franc Zone, and lagged arms imports in the aid allocation equation indicates that, ceteris paribus, more aid goes to countries with more regulation.
Instrumenting for aid with population in the regulation equation reveals that, ceteris paribus, more aid leads to less regulation. Thus, at the aggregate level, the results suggest effective conditionality. This result is somewhat at odds with the broader literature on the ineffectiveness of conditionality but in line with Harms and Lutz (2003) .
Thus, the literature provides substantial guidance for empirical work on issues of aid and regulation. Although many studies find that aid allocation is not guided by the policy 7 Regarding arms imports, they state: "To capture strategic interests we also use a measure of arms imports relative to total imports lagged one period. This variable helps explain the allocation of aid to middle-income countries, but has only minor relevance in the low-income country data set" (BD, 26-7).
9 environment in recipient countries, empirical studies must continue to test for potential endogeneity. Donors could consider the level of regulation in aid allocation in a number of ways.
Ex post conditionality (selectivity) implies allocating more aid to countries with less regulated economies. Conversely, there could be a bias toward highly regulated economies if the woes of excess regulation result in greater need or if donors hope to "buy reform" (deregulation) through ex ante conditionality as in traditional structural adjustment. Likewise, aid may influence the level of regulation. Although empirical evidence of endogeneity is mixed, we must examine these issues.
Looking across the previous literature, a number of instruments for regulation and aid present themselves. BD estimate an aid allocation equation (BD's Table 8 ) which includes variables intended to reflect donors' economic and strategic motives. Some of these prove insignificant including membership in the West African Franc Zone (so called CFA countries)
and arms imports as a share of overall imports. 7 The first is intended to measure links to France while the second may reflect alliances with donors such as the United States and its close allies;
both are expected to result in more aid but prove insignificant. However, even if these are unrelated to aid allocation, there is reason to suppose they could be related to the level of regulation. Particularly during the late 1980s and early 1990s, CFA countries experienced severe macroeconomic problems because of exchange rate misalignment. Governments in CFA countries may attempt to counteract resulting imbalances via regulation. A high value for arms imports as a share of total imports suggests a repressive regime, one likely associated with widespread corruption and regulation. The mechanism for this may follow Svensson's description of a highly divided society (a similar story as for ethnolinguistic fractionalization) or may simply be the result of the approach of a repressive regime. 8 In short, BD show these are unrelated to aid allocation while Svensson's work suggests they (and ethnolinguistic fractionalization) may be linked to kleptocracy and hence to corruption and regulatory burden.
Svensson also provides an instrument for aid, namely population. Research on aid allocation has long shown a bias against large countries; with aid as a share of GDP, this appears as a negative coefficient on population (e.g., BD; Alesina and Dollar, 2000) . If bilateral donors want to have programs in many countries (for example, to influence UN voting), they will under fund populous recipients to stretch their budgets while over funding very small recipients to justify fixed administrative costs of a country program. In the case of multilateral lending agencies such as the World Bank, limiting lending to populous recipients also limits their importance in terms of the lending pipeline and repayments, and thus prevents them from exercising leverage over the multilateral.
However, the disaggregated approach in this study poses new hurdles. While looking at World Bank lending, it is necessary to account for other aid as well. The regulation equation includes two aid variables, World Bank lending and other aid, and thus at least one unique instrument is needed for each to identify their effects separately. Finding such measures is not straightforward. 9 In this paper, I rely on lagged values of the variables themselves and of repayments.
III. Data and Model
I draw on four existing data sets to examine the links between aid and regulation. The primary measure of regulation comes from the Fraser Institute and is an aggregate measure of "Freedom from Government Regulation" (FGR). 10 The variable can range from 0 (low freedom from government regulation = high regulation) to 10 (high freedom from government regulation = low regulation) and is available for 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2001 though not all years are available for all countries. This is one of five components averaged together to generate the Fraser Institute's "Economic Freedom of the World" index. FGR is itself an aggregate of fifteen sub-indices, five each related to credit market regulation, labor market regulation, and business regulation.
Several different measures of aid are available. Much of the work cited above (BD; Easterly et. al., 2004; Roodman, 2004; Kilby, 2005) The auxiliary analysis in Table 4 compares results for bilateral and multilateral aid using conventional data (BAID it and MAID it ) and EDA data (BEDA it and MEDA it ). All are given as a percentage of real GDP to reflect the relative importance of aid to the recipient government. I use the natural log of period averages throughout.
The remaining variables come from the data set (five year averages) posted by Roodman (2004) , an extension of data and work done by Easterly et al. (2004 Finally, three variables previously discussed are an indicator for CFA countries (CFA i ), imports of military equipment as a share of total imports lagged by one period (ARMS it!1 ), and an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1960 (ETHNIC i ).
The regulation variable is measured at five year intervals that fall at the start of the averaged five year period for the other data. For this reason, I lagged the other variables in the aid allocation equations. The basic specifications for recipient country i in period t are (suppressing geographic and time dummies are):
Equation (1) 14 assumptions across countries in the panel (e.g., Levin et al., 2002) . 15 This statement is a bit too strong since expectations about regulation during the period could certainly influence income. 16 Because the influence and identification of outliers in this data has been controversial (Easterly et al., 2004; Roodman, 2004) , application of Hadi's method is becoming standard.
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GDP_CAP it!1 is the initial value at the start of period t!1 so that it could not be influenced directly by current regulation (FGR it ). 15 GDP_CAP it!1 is likely to enter positively though the direction of causation is controversial. Much of the research on the indices produced by the Fraser Institute has focused on how these various aspects of "Economic Freedom" may promote growth and hence be linked indirectly to higher incomes. However, when considering income itself, it is also plausible that "Economic Freedom" is a normal good, the consumption of which rises with income (Hanson 2003 Baum et al., 2003) as well as the individual test outlined in Wooldridge (2003, 508) . 18 The hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected if the instrument set includes the contemporaneous repayment variable (WBrepay it ).
19 In this specification (with lagged World Bank lending included), population no longer enters significantly on its own. We can instead use it as an additional instrument for AID it .
16 high as 7. The initial sample for the regulation equation is 384 but 8 outliers are dropped leaving 376 observations on 74 countries. In specifications that include the previous period's regulation index (FGR it!1 ), the sample falls to 310 observations on 74 countries.
The appendix provides details on the data used. Table A1 lists countries and coverage periods. Basic descriptive statistics are in Table A2 and simple correlations in Table A3 . All three tables cover the overall sample except where noted.
IV. Estimation Results
The first step in the empirical analysis is testing the validity of instruments in the case of over-identifying restrictions. 17 In the aid allocation equation (equation 1 18 associated with a 0.4% decrease in aid as a share of GDP or a 1.3% decrease in the dollar amount of aid holding GDP rather than GDP per capita constant. Arms imports (lagged one period, i.e., 5 years) has a positive and significant link to aid. This is consistent with the rationale offered by BD that high arms imports reflect a country's strategic importance to major donors. Ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in the arms imports to total imports ratio is associated with a 3% increase in the aid to GDP ratio. Dummy variables for Egypt and Israel are also significant, presumably driven in large part by the Camp David Accords.
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The second column (AID 2) introduces the regulation index as an explanatory variable.
The index indicates how "free" an economy is from government regulation so that a higher value indicates less regulation. The coefficient estimate on FGR is positive but insignificant indicating that the level of regulation is not an important determinant in the aid allocation decision. The other coefficient estimates are virtually unaffected by the inclusion of FGR.
The third column adds two lagged variables. The first is the lagged value of the dependent variable (AID it!1 , i.e., the ratio of aid to GDP for the previous 5 year period). The second is the lagged value of aid repayments (AIDrepay it!1 ), again as a share of recipient GDP.
The estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable of 0.61 indicates considerable persistence across time and, as we would expect, its inclusion substantially reduces the size of the other coefficient estimates. It has no effect, however, on the sign or significance of the key variables. Notable, the coefficient on regulation continues to be small and insignificant.
The fourth column includes World Bank disbursements as an explanatory variable. The 22 This column estimates a dynamic panels with fixed effects. Although OLS is known to be biased in this application, it remains a reasonable approach given the trade-offs faced with other methods.
These issues are summarized nicely in Falaschetti (2003) : the resulting bias is concentrated in estimated coefficient for the lagged dependent variable with Monte Carlo studies indicating that the other parameter estimates (i.e., the parameters of interest here) are no more biased than the estimates from IV, corrected fixed effects, and GMM methods (e.g., Arellano and Bonds 1991 negative and significant coefficients on GDP per capita and population, positive on arms imports and lagged aid. The estimated coefficient on regulation is very near zero.
The final column of Table 1 presents fixed effects estimates to account for any time invariant country specific factors omitted from previous specifications. 22 The central results are the same in this specification: the level of regulation remains an insignificant determinant of the level of aid a country receives.
[ Table 2 about here] Column 2 (WB 2) introduces the regulation index. As with other aid, World Bank disbursements do not appear to depend on the level of regulation in the recipient country and the estimated coefficients on other variables are largely unaffected when regulation is included.
Column 3 adds the lagged dependent variable (WBAID it!1 ) as well as lagged repayments (WBrepay it!1 ). World Bank disbursements exhibit considerably less persistence than seen in Table 1 for other aid but the impact on other estimates is similar. The coefficients for GDP per capita and population shrink somewhat but preserve their sign and significance. The coefficient estimate for regulation becomes negative but remains insignificant.
Column 4 of Table 2 adds AID it . The coefficient estimate is actually larger than that for the lagged dependent variable and, once it is included, the apparent population bias in World Bank lending disappears: the coefficient on population switches from negative and significant to positive and insignificant. The coefficients on WBAID i,t!1 and GDP_CAP it are substantially reduced. The dummy for Israel is now negative and significant indicating that World Bank lending does not mirror other aid in the case of Israel. As before, regulation remains insignificant.
As noted above, test results indicate AID it is endogenous in the World Bank equation.
24 Population drops from the specification so that it can be added to the list of instruments though the results are quite similar without this step.
Column 5 presents instrumental variable estimates. 24 The results are entirely comparable to those discussed above with instrumented AID it still entering as positive and significant (though now on par with the lagged dependent variable). As seen throughout, the level of regulation remains insignificant. Column 6 introduces fixed effects which influence the size of some coefficient estimates but not the general results: regulation remains insignificant, AID it and WBAID it!1 remain positive and significant, GDP per capita remains negative and significant, and population remains positive and insignificant. The final column combines these techniques estimating instrumental variables with fixed effects. The key difference here is that instrumented AID it is not statistically significant. We would expect to see this result if the instruments were largely capturing cross country rather than intertemporal variation in aid. The coefficient on regulation, though increased somewhat, is again insignificant. Thus, across all the specifications and methods examined, World Bank disbursement is not responsive to the regulatory environment in recipient countries.
[ Table 3 about here] Table 3 turns to determinants of regulation. It is important to recall that the dependent variable, FGR it , is the 0-to-10 "freedom from government regulation" index so that increases (positive coefficients) correspond to deregulation. Column 1 (FGR 1) presents a baseline specification. One striking result is the strong link between arms imports and regulation with higher arms imports associated with more regulation. In all but the final specification, the 25 This is true even if we maximize the sample by dropping other variables with limited coverage.
Given the strength of the relationship, this link deserves further empirical and theoretical exploration.
22 estimated coefficient on arms imports is large and highly significant. 25 The estimated coefficient on GDP per capita is positive and significant with a 1% increase in GDP per capita associated with roughly a 0.3 point increase in the regulation index, indicating that rising GDP per capita is strongly linked to deregulation. In contrast to Svensson's (2000A) Column 5 extends this by including both variables. In this specification, neither WBAID it!1 nor AID it!1 is individually significant but they are jointly significant at the 5% level. Table 4 addresses this question by repeating the fixed effects estimates (AID 5, WB 6, and FGR 6) but dividing disbursement data into multilateral and bilateral rather than World Bank and other. In addition, the right side of the table gives results using effective development assistance (EDA) data for bilateral and multilateral aid.
the allocation equations and 37 countries with 76 observations for the regulation equation.
measures.
[ Table 4 about here]
In the first estimation in Table 4 (BAID), the dependent variable is bilateral aid (i.e., the log of real bilateral aid disbursements as a share of recipient country real GDP). The estimated coefficient for FGR it is positive but small and statistically insignificant indicating that the regulatory environment is not an important determinant of bilateral aid flows. Aid from multilateral sources and past bilateral aid are both positively and significantly related to current bilateral aid. As before, GDP per capita is negative and significant, consistent with some degree of needed-based allocation. In a change from the previous estimation results, the bias against large countries is not evident though this needs to be interpreted in light of the country fixed effects. 27 As in Table 1 's AID 5, arms imports do not enter significantly in the fixed effects specification.
Switching to effective development assistance data (BEDA, the right side of Table 4 ), the only qualitative difference in the estimation is the positive and significant coefficient for GDP per capita. One explanation for this is substantial bilateral loan aid directed toward low income countries, (e.g., Japanese aid) together with substantial bilateral grant aid directed toward middle income countries (e.g., U.S. aid). In any event, this result is not primarily due to fixed effects or the reduced sample. The key point to note is that regulation is an insignificant factor in bilateral aid allocation in both regressions.
The second set of regressions in Table 4 (MAID and MEDA) examine multilateral aid.
An interesting difference is immediately apparent. Whether using standard or EDA measures, the level of regulation appears to be a significant factor in the allocation process for multilateral agencies as a whole. A one point increase in the "freedom from regulation" index is associated with a 0.12% increase in the ratio of multilateral disbursements to GDP and a slightly larger 0.16% increase in the ratio of multilateral EDA disbursements to GDP. As before, both current bilateral disbursements and previous multilateral disbursements have a significant link to current multilateral disbursements. Consistent with the previous aid literature, multilateral aid, whether measured in traditional or EDA terms, reflects recipient need more consistently than bilateral aid.
The bias against large countries is not significant when using EDA data though, again, this must be interpreted in the context of country fixed effects.
The last set of regressions are for the regulation equation with aid divided into bilateral (BAID it!1 ) and multilateral (MAID it!1 ) on the left and EDA divided into bilateral (BEDA it!1 ) and multilateral (MEDA it!1 ) on the right. Comparing the results to those in the last column of Table   3 (FGR 6), there is evident similarity in the impact on regulation of funds from the World Bank and other multilateral agencies. Thus, aid from the World Bank, like other multilateral aid, appears to reduce the level of regulation in recipient countries while bilateral aid has no impact.
V. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the debate over governance and aid by using panel data to examine links between aid flows and the level of regulation in recipient countries. As the World There is huge scope in most countries for improving regulation and taxation without compromising broader social interests. Too often, governments pursue approaches that fail to meet the intended social objective, yet harm the investment climate. How? By imposing unnecessary costs, by increasing uncertainty and risks, and by erecting unjustified barriers to competition. (World Bank, 2004, 95) Indeed, deregulation is a central component of policy reforms advocated and supported by the major international development agencies. The World Bank does acknowledge an important role for appropriate regulation: "Sound regulation addresses market failures that inhibit productive investment and reconciles the interests of firms with those of society" (World Bank, 2004, 95) .
But substantially more focus is on inappropriate regulation. The WDR points to three primary regulatory costs: 1) compliance; 2) uncertainty; and 3) barriers to competition. These drive firms into the informal sector, create an environment for corruption, and perpetuate unproductive monopolies. One of the main thrusts of the WDR is the need to reduce the regulatory burden to promote private investment which the World Bank sees as the engine of both growth and poverty reduction.
"Knowledge bank" notwithstanding, well-written reports on their own are unlikely to alter entrenched practices in developing countries. Actual implementation of such reforms depends on a better understanding of the multiple links between aid and regulation. There are reasons to expect a complex relationship between aid flows and the regulatory environment in recipient countries. This paper is an effort to delve into those relationships empirically, allowing for bidirectional links as well as differences between groups of donors, namely the World Bank, multilateral agencies, and bilateral donors.
The estimated aid allocation equations indicate that the level of regulation in a recipient country generally is not considered by bilateral donors. Multilateral agencies as a group do show a preference for good regulatory environments though this is not as a significant factor for the World Bank in the equations estimated. Turning to the impact of aid on the level of regulation, both overall multilateral aid and World Bank lending have an apparent linked to deregulation. In contrast, bilateral aid has no apparent impact on regulation.
The most direct interpretation of these results is that World Bank conditionality has been effective at promoting deregulation. This contrasts with more general research on World Bank structural adjustment efforts where lax enforcement of conditions results in little improvement in recipient behavior (e.g., Mosley et al., 1995) . It may be that the leverage of conditionality on and the resources to provide support for deregulation have been more effective than for other aspects of structural adjustment. The finding that World Bank and multilateral aid are more effective than bilateral aid is, however, consistent with much of the aid literature.
While coming from a very different angle, this work reenforces the central message of Easterly et al. (2004) that the empirical basis for selectivity remains tenuous. The case for selectively allocating aid to countries that have already undertaken reforms-the current direction of the World Bank and the core of President Bush's $5 billion Millennium Challenge Account aid initiative-rests on claims that recipient government policy has not been responsive to aid and that aid only promotes growth and reduces poverty in good policy environments. Indeed, the presupposition is not simply that aid has not induced policy reform but that aid cannot induce policy reform. Rather than looking to restructure aid institutions and instruments to improve aid's ability to directly promote good governance (through enforced conditions, appropriate technical assistance, channeling more aid through multilateral agencies), the selectivity argument favors abandoning the effort entirely. The evidence presented here that aid from the World Bank and other multilateral agencies can promote deregulation provides an important counter example, one that argues for improving the practice of aid rather than effectively abandoning the project. t-statistics and significance levels computed with robust standard errors. *=10% significance level; **=5% significance level. Aid variables (AID, WBAID, AIDrepay) measured as log of the 5 year average of real gross disbursements as a share of the recipient's real GDP. All specifications include period dummies. t-statistics and significance levels computed with robust standard errors. *=10% significance level; **=5% significance level. Aid variables (AID, WBAID, WBrepay) are measured as the log of the 5 year average of gross real disbursements as a share of real GDP. All specifications include period dummies. t-statistics and significance levels computed with robust standard errors. *=10% significance level; **=5% significance level. Aid variables (AID, WBAID) are measured as the log of the 5 year average of gross real disbursements as a share of real GDP. All specifications include period dummies. A We can reject the joint hypothesis that AID it!1 =0 and WBAID it!1 =0 at the 95% confidence level. 
